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Abstract—By leveraging large clusters of commodity hardware,
the Cloud offers great opportunities to optimize the operative
costs of software systems, but impacts significantly on the relia-
bility of software applications. The lack of control of applications
over Cloud execution environments largely limits the applicability
of state-of-the-art approaches that address reliability issues by
relying on heavyweight training with injected faults.
In this paper, we propose LOUD, a lightweight fault local-
ization approach that relies on positive training only, and can
thus operate within the constraints of Cloud systems. LOUD
relies on machine learning and graph theory. It trains machine
learning models with correct executions only, and compensates
the inaccuracy that derives from training with positive samples,
by elaborating the outcome of machine learning techniques with
graph theory algorithms. The experimental results reported in
this paper confirm that LOUD can localize faults with high
precision, by relying only on a lightweight positive training.
I. INTRODUCTION
Runtime failures are unavoidable in complex systems, and
challenge the reliability of software applications [11]. Runtime
failures are particularly hard to prevent in the cloud [48], since
cloud systems rely on commodity hardware that reduces the
overall system reliability, change rapidly to match evolving
and sometime conflicting requirements, and suffer from
confidentiality and visibility issues that may derive from the
diffuse ownership of the system components [2]. The growing
role of cloud systems in business-critical applications, like
virtual retail stores [10], and the trend towards moving
reliability-critical applications to the cloud, like the next
generation telecom infrastructures [18], introduce strict
reliability requirements that further exacerbate the problem.
The substantive characteristics of the cloud and the stringent
reliability requirements of software applications running in
the cloud, hereafter cloud applications, can be addressed at
runtime with approaches that predict and localize faults [15,
16, 8, 9, 20, 19, 35, 29, 38, 41, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49] to trigger
either automatic or manual recovery actions.
State-of-the-art fault localization approaches rely on long
training sessions based on injected faults, which is an expen-
sive and seldom-applicable practice, since it is hard to inject
multiple classes of faults in several machines with different
ownerships, and repeat this process while the system evolves.
In this paper we propose LOUD, an approach to accurately
localize faulty components in cloud virtualized environments.
LOUD locates faults as precisely as competing approaches [51,
9, 38], and is much more applicable in practice than competing
approaches, since it exploits models trained under normal
execution conditions only.
LOUD combines machine learning with graph centrality
algorithms: It relies on Key Performance Indicators (KPIs),
that is, metrics commonly collected on the running systems;
It exploits machine learning to both detect anomalies in KPIs
and reveal causal relationships among them; It complements
machine learning with algorithms based on centrality indices
to localize the faulty resources responsible for generating and
propagating anomalies. LOUD originally exploits the causal
relationships among KPIs and centrality indices to identify
the causes of the failures, thus compensating the imprecision
of anomaly detection based on models trained with positive
samples only that are notoriously prone to false positives.
LOUD can be paired with any state-of-the-art failure pre-
dictor to localize the likely faulty resources before observing
the failure, to enable automatic and manual healing.
The results of the experiments reported in Section VI indi-
cate that LOUD can locate faults with a precision comparable
to state-of-the-art approaches that rely on models trained with
injected faults, and with an accuracy that varies over time.
The main contributions of this paper are: (i) an approach
for modelling temporal correlations among anomalous values
of KPIs, (ii) a study of the relation among anomalous KPIs
during faulty executions, (iii) a technique to detect anomalies
that are most likely related to the fault, based on a set of
graph centrality indices, (iv) the experimental evaluation of
the proposed approach for locating different types of faults in
the context of various kinds of faulty resources.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II overviews
the LOUD approach. Sections III and IV present the core
data analytics and localizer components, respectively. Sec-
tion V discusses the methodology we used to evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed approach. Section VI illustrates
the experimental results about the effectiveness of LOUD.
Section VII discusses related work. Section VIII summarizes
the main contribution of the paper.
II. LOUD
LOUD is an online metric-driven fault localization tech-
nique, which analyses the dependencies among anomalous
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Fig. 1. The LOUD approach.
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) commonly available in
software systems at different abstraction levels to pinpoint the
faulty resources that are likely responsible of future failures.
Figure 1 illustrates the offline and (subsequent) online
phases that characterize the LOUD logical architecture. In the
offline phase, LOUD trains a model that captures the normal
system behavior. In the online phase, LOUD uses the model to
pinpoint the faulty resources that are likely to be responsible
of a possible failure.
The LOUD Data Analytics offline phase monitors the cloud
system that operates in the field to model the system execution
under normal conditions in the form of relations among Key
Performance Indicators (monitored KPIs), which are metrics
collected on a regular basis from target resources of the system
at different abstraction levels [12]. Examples of KPIs are the
amount of occupied memory in a physical server, the CPU
consumption of a virtual machine and the number of connec-
tions accepted by an application. These KPIs are sampled with
probes that are deployed in the monitored resource [17, 3].
The LOUD Data Analytics offline phase produces a set
of baseline models of the KPIs and a causality graph. The
KPI baseline models represent the values of the KPIs that
characterize normal behaviors. The causality graph models
the causal dependencies among KPIs. Causal dependencies
indicate the strength of the correlation between pairs of
KPIs, that is, the extent to which changes in one KPI can
cause changes in another KPI. The nodes in the causality
graph correspond to KPIs, and the weighted edges indicate
the causal relationships among KPIs. LOUD computes the
baseline models and the causality graph using data collected
when monitoring normal executions. LOUD exploits both the
KPI baseline models and the causality graph in the online
phase to localize faulty resources.
During the online operations, LOUD regularly monitors and
verifies the KPIs against the baseline models (Data Analytics–
online), creates the propagation graph, and localizes the faulty
resource (Localization). LOUD executes the online as well
as offline activities on an independent machine to avoid side
effects on the production system, which is monitored with
lightweight monitoring probes.
The LOUD Data Analytics online phase relies on IBM
ITOA-PI [17], to identify the anomalous KPIs, that is, KPI
values that violate the KPI baseline models. The LOUD
Localization phase combines the set of anomalous KPIs with
the causality graph to derive the propagation graph, which
is the subgraph of the causality graph with anomalous KPIs
only. Intuitively, it models the mutual influence among the
anomalous KPIs. As the set of anomalies changes over time,
the propagation graph also changes at every timestamp.
LOUD is designed to operate in cascade to a failure predic-
tor. By relying solely on the prediction of a possible failure,
LOUD can be integrated with any off-the-shelf predictor [32,
13, 38, 34, 47, 50, 46]. When triggered by a failure prediction,
the LOUD Localization phase analyzes the propagation graphs
produced at runtime, and identifies the faulty resource that
corresponds to the likely root cause of the failure.
LOUD localizes faults under the hypothesis that the anoma-
lous KPIs related to a fault are highly correlated and form
a connected subgraph of the propagation graph. In particular,
LOUD assumes that the incorrect behavior of a faulty resource
is likely to result in incorrect behavior of neighbor resources,
which are resources that interact with the faulty one either
directly or indirectly. Intuitively, a misbehaving resource, such
as a client that generates an unusually high load of requests or
a virtual machine that consumes an unusually high amount of
memory, usually affects related resources, such as the server
application that processes the requests issued by the client or
the host machine that runs the VM. Based on this assumption,
LOUD exploits graph centrality indices [24, 27, 39] to identify
the anomalous KPIs that best characterize the root cause of a
predicted failure.
Since KPIs are metrics collected on specific resources, the
KPIs with the highest centrality scores likely indicate the
faulty resources that might be responsible for the predicted
failure. The empirical results reported in Section VI indicate
that the LOUD strategy based on centrality indices can effec-
tively localize several classes of relevant faults in resources of
different types.
In the next sections we describe the Data Analytics, KPI
Analysis and Localization phases.
III. DATA ANALYTICS AND KPI ANALYSIS
The Data Analytics component is composed of an offline
and an online engine. The offline engine builds both a baseline
model for each KPI, which captures the legal behavior of the
KPI, and a causality graph, which captures causal relations
between KPIs. The online engine identifies anomalies, that is,
KPIs that violate their baseline models. Both the offline and
online data analytics engines can be implemented with off-
the-shelf IT operations analytics tool suites. We implement the
LOUD Data Analytics engine with IBM ITOA-PI, a reliable
product that provides advanced analytics technologies. To
make the paper self-contained, we provide essential infor-
mation about IBM ITOA-PI. The interested can refer to the
documentation [17] for additional details.
The Data Analytics component elaborates data about KPIs
provided in the form of time ordered sequences of data points.
A KPI is a pair 〈M,R〉, where M is a metric and R is the
monitored resource. The metrics capture measurable aspects
of the behavior of the monitored system, for example memory
consumption, number of requests served per minute, and so
on. The resource can be any element of a system, for instance
a host, a virtual machine, and a specific application.
Table I shows the sample case of a same metric, Busy CPU,
which indicates the percentage of CPU usage, collected from
two sample resources, the virtual machines bono and ellis.
TABLE I
EXAMPLE DATA COLLECTED FOR TWO KPIS
Timestamps 〈Busy CPU, Bono〉 〈Busy CPU, Ellis〉
1440765146 0.348 0.137
1440765506 0.447 0.164
1440765866 0.539 0.137
IBM ITOA-PI produces a baseline model for each KPI
and a causality graph for the whole system from the KPI
data collected during an initial training phase that spans
across multiple weeks of runtime and a constant retraining
phase which takes place when new KPI data are available.
The baseline model represents information about the average
values and the acceptable variations over time of a KPI, by
considering data seasonality. A KPI value monitored after
the training phase is reported as anomalous if outside the
acceptable variations coded in the baseline model or if the
causal relationships represented in the graph have broken.
IBM ITOA-PI updates the model periodically at runtime to
prevent false negatives and reduce any bias that might derive
from incorrect behaviour occurring during the learning phase.
The causality graph is a directed weighted graph where
nodes correspond to KPIs and edges represent causal relations
among KPIs. A directed edge with a weight w between nodes
na and nb that correspond to the KPIs a and b, respectively,
indicates that a is correlated with b according to the Granger
statistical test with a probability w. The Granger causality
test is specifically designed to capture correlation among time
series data [14, 1].
The KPI Analysis phase exploits the causality graph and
the set of anomalous KPIs to produce the propagation graph,
which is a model that represents the anomalous KPIs and
their interaction. Since the set of anomalous KPIs changes
at each timestamp, the propagation graph is also different at
each timestamp.
The propagation graph can be derived from the causality
graph by preserving only the nodes corresponding to anoma-
lous KPIs and their direct connections. More formally, given
a set of anomalous KPI KA and a causality graph (K,E),
where K is the set of KPIs and e = (n1, w, n2) ∈ E is
the set of weighted edges between KPIs, the propagation
graph is the maximal connected subgraph (KA, E′), with
E′ = {(n1, w, n2) ∈ E|n1, n2 ∈ KA}. Figure 2 shows a
sample propagation graph (on the right hand side) that has
been generated from the causality graph (on the left hand side)
in our experiments.
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Fig. 2. A sample causality graph and a corresponding propagation graph
IV. LOCALIZATION
When triggered by a failure prediction, the LOUD Lo-
calization phase identifies the likely faulty resource by first
ranking the KPIs whose values are detected as anomalous,
and then selecting the faulty resource based on the ranking.
The Localization phase is grounded on the observation that,
once activated, faults cause increasingly many anomalies that
spread both within the faulty resource and to resources either
directly or indirectly interconnected to the faulty one. For
instance, when a memory leak in a process exhausts the
memory of the server, it may prevent the process generating
responses to incoming requests, thus propagating to processes
that share the memory with the faulty process, such as the
virtual and host machines that run the process, as well as
to other client processes that do not receive the expected
responses, thus spreading anomalies within the same and to
correlated resources.
The problem of identifying the fault location can be for-
mulated as the problem of locating the nodes that originated
the spreading of the anomalies represented in the series of
propagation graphs built at runtime.
The problem cannot be solved by simply selecting the node
that becomes anomalous first in the time series of propagation
graphs because (i) the data analytics component identifies
anomalies both in normal and in faulty executions, so it is hard
to distinguish between a “root” anomaly and a false alarm, (ii)
often the first anomaly does not correspond to the actual fault,
but may correspond to an indirect effect not always easily
traceable to the root fault.
LOUD works based on the assumption that the faulty
resource is likely to generate an increasing number of strongly
correlated anomalies over time during a faulty execution.
This assumption comes from experimental evaluation over
all the performed experiments both on faulty and failure-free
executions.
The propagation graph is a powerful model to study the
spread and the impact of anomalies across resources since
its edges capture dependencies among KPIs. For instance,
the propagation graph may capture the indirect correlation
between the KPI that corresponds to the number of packets
sent by a resource and the KPI that corresponds to the memory
consumption of a machine that does not even receive these
packets, but is indirectly impacted by the generated traffic.
LOUD identifies the nodes in the propagation graph that cor-
respond the faulty resource, assigning scores through centrality
indices, which are commonly used to identify the relevant
nodes in weighted graphs with respect to the connectivity
among nodes. The nodes in the propagation graph with the
highest centrality scores identify the anomalous KPIs most
likely related to the faulty resource. Thus we have a series of
highly scored KPIs, one for each timestamp.
We considered different centrality indices, by focusing on
the ones that take into account the global influence of a single
node on the whole graph. For this reason, we discarded:
(i) the degree centrality and its generalizations because they
do not consider how anomalies can spread on a graph,
(ii) the betweenness centrality and closeness centrality in-
dices since they are based on shortest paths and thus do not
take into account the global structure of the graph, which is
important for the diffusion of anomalies.
We considered eigenvector centrality and its generalizations,
non-backtracking centrality, HITS algorithm for hubs and au-
thorities, and PageRank. These indices meet our requirements
because they assign the highest score to the node with the
highest information flow, and take into account the directions
and weights of the links, and the presence of noise in the
spread of the information within the graph.
Below, we introduce the centrality indices that we exploited
for fault localization. We define all the indices referring to a
same representation of the propagation graph based on the
adjacency matrix W , where Wij is the value of the weight
w(i, j) of the edge from node i to node j. The value is 0 if
there is no edge between node i and node j.
The eigenvector centrality is a vector c whose ith compo-
nent ci represents the score of the node i [39]. In a graph with
n nodes, the score ci is
ci = µ
n∑
j=1
Wijcj (1)
that is proportional to the sum of the weights of the edges
that connect the node i to its neighbors, where µ is a
proportionality constant that derives from the matrix of the
eigenvalues. The eigenvector centrality score can be computed
iteratively from Equation 1, and the solution is unique for a
strongly connected graph with non-negative weights, as the
case of propagation graphs.
Fig. 3. Sample rankings for the nodes of the propagation graph of Figure 2
The eigenvector centrality may produce misleading results
when the graph contains very few nodes that act as strong
hubs and create a “condensation” or “winner-takes-it-all”
phenomenon [27]. This is because the eigenvector centrality
assigns to such nodes a much higher score than to most of
the nodes, thus hiding the relevance of the other nodes which
get a score close to zero, even if they might be related to the
faulty resource. In our case, this phenomenon may potentially
bias the localization and cause false positives.
The non-backtracking centrality is a variation of the eigen-
vector centrality that produces more accurate centrality scores
in the presence of a condensation effect. Intuitively, the non-
backtracking centrality scores a node i as the sum of the
scores of its neighbors computed in the absence of the node i
itself [27].
The non-backtracking centrality can be computed from
equation (1) by substituting the adjacency matrix with the non-
backtracking matrix B, defined as Bij = Wij iff (i, j) forms a
non-backtracking path of length 2. A non-backtracking path is
a directed path in which no edge is the inverse of the preceding
edge [31].
The assumption behind the eigenvector and non-
backtracking centrality is that a node is important if it
is attached to many edges coming from many other important
nodes. In the propagation graph, these nodes represent KPIs
which are more influenced by the spread of anomalies.
The Hyperlink Induced Topic Search (HITS) algorithm
assigns a high score to nodes that are linked with other highly
scored nodes [23]. This intuitively corresponds to identifying
the KPIs that have a strong influence on the behavior of the
system, and thus the corresponding resources. These relevant
nodes might be of two kinds: authorities, which are the nodes
that are the destination of edges from highly ranked nodes, and
hubs, which are the nodes with many outgoing edges leading
to highly ranked nodes.
The equations to score nodes as authorities (ai) or hubs (hi)
are:
n∑
j=1
Wij aj = δ hi,
n∑
k=1
Wik hk = ν aj
where δ and ν are proportionality constants related to eigen-
values of W . The HITS algorithm combines the two equations
to compute iteratively a hub score and an authority score for
each node in the graph.
PageRank [24] scores nodes according to both the number
of incoming edges and the probability of anomalies to ran-
domly spread through the graph (teleportation). The PageRank
score ri of node i is computed iteratively from the score rj
of the nodes j that are sources of edges directed to i:
ri =
∑
j∈Nin(i)
Wij rj +
1− α
n
(2)
where Nin(i) is the set of nodes j that are sources of edges
directed to i, and α is the teleportation probability (LOUD
uses α = 0.85). The interested reader can refer to the excellent
description of Langville et al. [24] for a detailed survey on the
HITS algorithm and PageRank.
Figure 3 exemplifies the effects of the different centrality
indices on the propagation graph of Figure 2. The Figure
shows in different colors the nodes with the highest score
for each algorithm. The red node is the top ranked node of
both eigenvector and non-backtracking centrality, which means
that the centrality index is evenly distributed through many
important nodes in the graph, and the variations of the non-
backtracking centrality have a low impact on the scores. The
Figure illustrates the dual role of hubs and authorities: there is
a directed edge from the top HITS Hub node to the top HITS
Authority node. The role of the purple highest PageRank node
is similar to the role of the red highest centrality node, since
both are destination of highly weighted edges. The two nodes
are different due to the impact of the PageRank teleportation.
LOUD computes the four centrality indices with the power
iteration algorithm that computes the indices with an increas-
ingly better approximation at each iteration, and can thus
be interrupted and later resumed at any time to improve the
precision of the localization.
LOUD identifies the likely faulty resource as the most
frequent resource in the top 20 KPIs according to the selected
centrality index, and does not suggest a fault location in the
absence of a most frequent resource in the set. The intuition is
that a faulty resource is likely to show an anomalous behavior
for multiple KPIs, which in turn are likely to affect several
other resources, and thus their KPIs, of the system. As a
consequence a faulty resource is likely to be present with
multiple KPIs in the top part of the ranking.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we describe the experimental setting for
evaluating LOUD: We introduce the research questions (Sec-
tion V-A), the testbed that implements the cloud-based system
that we use in the evaluation (Section V-B), the process for
executing the experiments and collecting the data from the
testbed (Section V-C), and the set of faults that we seeded in
the system for evaluating LOUD (Section V-D).
A. Research Questions
In the experiments, we addressed three research questions
that qualify the effectiveness and overhead of LOUD:
RQ1: Does the choice of centrality index impact on the
precision of LOUD fault localization?
As discussed in Section IV, LOUD implements five
centrality-based indices that are potentially suitable for
fault localization. We experimentally compared the effec-
tiveness of the different indices, to evaluate their impact
on fault localization.
RQ2: Do the type of the faulty resource, the type of the fault
and the activation pattern impact on the effectiveness of
LOUD localization?
We evaluated the accuracy of LOUD with different kinds
of faults injected in various types of resources with
distinct activation patterns to evaluate the impact of these
factors on LOUD precision. We executed the experiments
with the PageRank centrality index, which the experi-
ments for RQ1 indicate as the most effective index for
the LOUD localization.
RQ3 What is the overhead of LOUD on the cloud environ-
ment?
LOUD is a lightweight approach that isolates the resource
consuming activities on a dedicated server, and deploys
only probes in the cloud environment. Thus, probes are
the only LOUD elements that may impact on the cloud
system. We evaluated the impact of the LOUD probes by
comparing the execution time of the monitored resources
with and without active probes.
B. Testbed
We executed the experiments on a cloud environment
running ClearWater,1 an open source implementation of an
IP Multimedia Subsystem. The cluster running ClearWater
consists of 8 server machines that share a local subnet. Each
machine runs Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. We installed OpenStack
Icehouse2 to manage the cluster. We configured the cluster
with six compute nodes that run the KVM hypervisor3 and
host the Virtual Machine (VM) instances that run ClearWater,
1Project Clearwater. IMS in the Cloud. http://www.projectclearwater.org.
Last access: oct 2017
2The OpenStack Project. Open source software for creating private and
public clouds. https://www.openstack.org/. Last access: oct 2017
3The KVM Project. Kernel Based Virtual Machine. https://www.linux-kvm.
org/. Last access: oct 2017.
a controller node that offers VM managing services, from
the basic ones, like creation, deletion and reboot, to more
advanced ones, like identity services, image service and dash-
board, and a network node that routes virtual networks through
NAT.
Table II shows the hardware and software configuration of
each machine.
TABLE II
INFRASTRUCTURE AND PLATFORM CONFIGURATION
Role Controller Network Compute (x2) Compute (x4)
CPU
Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Quad CPU Q9650
(12M Cache, 3.00 GHz, 1333 MHz FSB)
RAM 4 GB 4 GB 8 GB 4 GB
Disk 250 GB SATA hard disk
NIC Intel(R) 82545EM Gigabit Ethernet Controller
Clearwater [6] exploits six virtual machines to provide
messaging, voice and video communication using the SIP
protocol. In particular: Bono serves as entry point for users
connections, Sprout routes user requests forwarded by Bono
and checks authentication, Homestead provides the user au-
thentication and profile data, which are stored in a database
for Sprout to inquire through a web service interface, Homer
stores MMTEL service settings of users in the form of standard
XML, Ralf provides offline billing features by interacting with
Bono and Sprout, Ellis runs as a web sever for users to register
and manage personal profile and settings.
Figure 4 illustrates the logical architecture of the system,
indicating dependencies across layers.
OpenStack Servers
Virtual Machines
Control Network Compute1 Compute2 Compute3 Compute4 Compute5 Compute6
Ellis
Bono
Sprout
Homer
Homestead
Ralf
SI
P
HTTP
HTTP
XCAP
HTTP
HTTP
ClearWater
HTTP
Fig. 4. Reference Logical Architecture
C. Data Generation and Collection
We executed our testbed with a workload implemented with
the SIPp open source SIP traffic generator4. We shaped the
number of users and calls in the workload based on week and
day patterns: within each week, the number of users in working
4Gayraud Richard and Jacques Olivier. SIPp. http://sipp.sourceforge.net.
Last access: may 2015.
days is higher than in weekends, with each a day, the number
of users grows at daytime and decreases at nighttime, with
peaks at 9am and 7pm.
We based the LOUD monitoring on KPIs collected from the
both the operating system and ClearWater. At the operating
system level, LOUD uses a set of monitoring probes that
collect 25 KPIs on the status of both the machines and the
communication interfaces. LOUD implements the monitoring
probes with common Linux monitoring tools such as the
iostat, sar, vmstat, free, ps, ping, and the Psutil Python library.
LOUD monitors the operating systems running on both the
host and the virtual machines, and the machines that host
the compute nodes. LOUD collects a total of 300 KPIs at
the operating system level for the 6 compute nodes and
6 virtual machines. At the Application level, LOUD uses
the SNMPv2c [5] monitoring service for ClearWater, which
provides a total of 162 KPIs for the 6 ClearWater machines.
The LOUD monitor samples the 462 KPIs every minute,
and sends the collected data to the analysis server that runs
the LOUD approach. In our setup, the analysis server runs Red
Hat Enterprise Linux Server 6.3 with an Intel(R) Core (TM) 2
Quad Q9650 processor at 3GHz frequency and 16GB RAM.
We trained LOUD offline with data collected by executing
the testbed for 2 weeks under normal conditions, as recom-
mended by IBM ITOA-PI. We used the default setup for IBM
ITOA-PI, which aggregates and analyzes data in time intervals
of 5 minutes.
D. Investigated Faults
We simulated faulty scenarios using fault injection tech-
niques. We injected fault types commonly used in the evalu-
ation of state-of-the-art fault localization approaches [38, 36,
16, 22]: packet loss, memory leak and CPU hog. For each fault
we considered different severity growth patterns: (i) linear
pattern, the fault is triggered with a same frequency over
time, (ii) exponential pattern, the fault is activated with a
frequency that increases exponentially, resulting in a shorter
time to failure, (iii) random pattern, the fault is activated
randomly over time. We injected the faults by adapting the
ChaosMonkey open-source failure generator5 to enable the
various types of fault severity growths.
We injected each type of fault in Bono, Sprout and Home-
stead, which are the three core components of ClearWater. To
increase the generality of the results, we repeated the injection
process four times for each type of fault. This produces a
total of 108 experimented cases: 3 types of faults (packet
loss, memory leak, CPU hog) injected in 3 different resources
(Bono, Sprout, Homestead) with 3 different activation patterns
repeated four times.
E. Quality Metrics
We measure the effectiveness of LOUD (RQ1 and RQ2) by
computing precision, recall, and F1-score of the localization at
5Cory Bennett. Chaos Monkey. https://github.com/Netflix/SimianArmy/
wiki/Chaos-Monkey. Last access: oct 2017.
Fig. 5. F1-score of each technique per fault type
each timestamp after the activation of the fault. In particular,
we define true/false positive/negatives as follows:
• true positive (TP) at time t: the LOUD localization
produced at time t is correct,
• false positive (FP) at time t: the LOUD localization
produced at time t is wrong,
• false negative (FN) at time t: LOUD cannot identify a
most frequent resource in the top 20 anomalies, and thus
does not produce a localization at time t.
We compute the precision as the rate of correct localizations
out of the total set of localizations produced at time t: TPTP+FP .
We compute the recall as the rate of correct localizations out
of the total set of localizations that should have been generated
at time t: TPTP+FN . We compute the F1-score as the harmonic
average between precision and recall: 2 precision∗recallprecision+recall .
We measure the intrusiveness of the probes by computing
the overhead of the probes (RQ3).
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the results of our experiments
organized according to the research questions presented above.
A. RQ1: Does the choice of centrality index impact on the
precision of LOUD fault localization?
We evaluate the impact of the centrality index by mea-
suring the effectiveness of LOUD in localising faults, when
executing LOUD with the different indices for various types
of injected faults. Figure 5 shows how the effectiveness of the
localization changes over time for the five centrality indices
that we identified in Section IV, eigenvector centrality, non-
backtracking centrality, HITS algorithm for hubs and authori-
ties, and PageRank, and for the three classes of faults that we
considered, packet loss, memory leak, and CPU hog.
The diagrams reported in this and all the figures of the paper
show the F1-score computed for experiments starting from a
fault injected at time 0 and lasting 120 minutes. The null value
of F1-score for the first 20 minutes of the experiments derives
from IBM ITOA-PI, which does not compute anomalies for
the first 20 minutes of execution. In all the experiments, the
cloud system failed after the 120 minutes time interval shown
in the plots.
Figure 5 allows us to draw some considerations:
LOUD performs better with PageRank than with any other
considered index: LOUD with PageRank dominates every
other algorithm for all fault types through most of the observed
time interval. This indicates that PageRank, and the concept
of teleportation that encodes the probability of anomalies to
spread non-uniformly across the graph, as it may happen in
real scenarios, well captures how anomalies can spread in
cloud systems.
The effectiveness of LOUD localization depends on the
fault type: The effectiveness of fault localization strongly
depends on the kind of injected fault. Indeed, anomalies
spread according to significantly different patterns for different
fault types. Although the centrality indices present different
effectiveness for different fault types, the relative difficulty
to localize a fault does not depend on the specific centrality
index. Packet loss faults are the hardest faults to localize for
all the indices, likely because the effect of network problems
easily and quickly spreads through the system resources, in a
way that is difficult to trace back to the source node. Memory
leaks are also challenging but definitely easier to localize than
packet loss faults. CPU hogs spread with patterns that are the
easiest to trace back to the root cause among the considered
faults for all algorithms.
The effectiveness of the LOUD localization does not always
improve with time: The results do not confirm the intuition
that the quality of the localization improves over time, due to
the increased evidence of both the failures and their causes
over time. CPU hogs are the only type of faults with an
increasing quality of the localization over time. This is likely
due to the increasingly stronger impact of the CPU utilization
on the affected resource compared to the other resources of
the system. In the presence of both packet loss and memory
leaks, the quality of the localization first increases and then
decreases, with some perturbation in the intermediate phase.
This suggests that in an initial phase the anomalies incremen-
tally produced by a fault accumulate in a way that facilitates
the localization task, but at some point the spreading is so
extensive that it gets confused within the noise of the system,
that is, with the anomalies that are regularly produced by the
system despite the presence of faults.
Fig. 6. F1-score, precision and recall of PageRank per fault type
Fig. 7. F1-score, precision and recall of PageRank per activation pattern
Having identified PageRank as the index that leads to the
best performance compared to the other centrality indices, we
conducted all the other experiments with PageRank.
B. RQ2: Do the type of the faulty resource, the type of the
fault and the activation pattern impact on the effectiveness of
LOUD localization?
We investigate the effectiveness of the LOUD localization
with respect to three key dimensions: fault types, fault activa-
tion patterns, and faulty resources.
Figure 6 shows F1-score, precision, and recall of LOUD
with packet loss, memory leak and CPU hog injected faults.
The precision and recall follow some interesting and comple-
mentary trends for the different classes of faults.
The localization of packet loss faults reaches a high F1-
score only after a long time slack (about 65 minutes after
the fault injection, and 40 minutes after the first IBM ITOA-
PI anomaly), and does not stabilize, thus the localization often
fails in identifying the faulty resource, as witnessed by a recall
higher than precision. The localization of packet loss faults is
precise only in a fairly short time interval (about 10 minutes)
in terms of F1-score.
LOUD addresses well memory leak faults despite an un-
stable F1-score, as witnessed by an always high precision
with a drop of the recall when far from the fault activation.
Thus, LOUD may fail in identifying the fault location, but it
identifies it precisely when it succeeds.
LOUD addresses well CPU hogs both in terms of precision
and recall.
Figure 7 shows F1-score, precision and recall for the differ-
ent activation patterns averaged over fault types. LOUD shows
a similar trend for all the activation patterns, thus suggesting a
reasonable independence of the effectiveness of the technique
with respect to the growth rate.
The effectiveness of LOUD remains stable over time for
both the linear and random activation patterns, and slightly
decreases in the long term for the exponential pattern. This is
likely due to the rapid increase and spread of anomalies that
impact on the effectiveness of the localization algorithm.
Figure 8 shows the F1-score, precision and recall per
resource, and indicates that LOUD is precise for all the
resources, slightly less stable for Homestead. A careful in-
spection of the results indicates that the localization phase
sometime erroneously identifies Sprout as the faulty resource
instead of Homestead. The architecture of the testbed dis-
cussed in Section V-B shows that Homestead and Sprout are
highly interacting. Since LOUD locates well faults for other
highly interacting resources, for instance Bono and Sprout, the
relatively lower effectiveness for Homestead may depend on
the specific characteristics of the interaction. In our prototype
setting, the KPIs are unevenly distributed among Sprout and
Homestead: 92 KPIs for Sprout, 71 KPIs for Homestead. Since
a fault in Homestead is likely to impact on both resources, the
smaller number of KPIs for Homestead than Sprout may bias
the fault localization in favour of Sprout. The results might be
likely improved by either collecting a set of evenly distributed
KPIs or introducing a normalization strategy that takes into
account the number of KPIs extracted from each resource.
Both studies are part of our current research plan.
C. RQ3: What is the overhead of LOUD on the cloud
environment?
The LOUD overhead on the production system derives only
from the monitoring probes, which collect and send data to
Fig. 8. F1-score, precision and recall of PageRank per resource
the analysis node running LOUD. LOUD can be executed
either on a separated node of the cloud system or on a
separate machine outside of the cloud environment. In the
former case, the cloud infrastructure has to allocate enough
resources to support the execution of the analysis node, in
the latter case, LOUD does not require additional resources
from the cloud infrastructure. In both cases, LOUD does not
introduce significant overhead on the monitored resources: In
our experiments, we measured an average increase of 2.63%
on CPU usage and 1.91% on memory usage of the monitored
resources, which is a negligible overhead for cloud services.
Overall, LOUD demonstrates to be effective in localizing
faults in the cloud, with an effectiveness that depends on
the kind of fault to be localized, but is largely independent
from the fault activation pattern. In particular, LOUD is very
effective with CPU hogs (the LOUD localization is precise,
quick and constantly available after the activation of the
fault), memory leaks (the LOUD localization is always precise,
although sometime hindered by the noise in the anomalies),
and useful with packet loss (the LOUD localization is precise,
at least in some time interval after the fault activation). These
results are extremely good, since the effectiveness of LOUD
is in line with the effectiveness of competing approaches,
but LOUD relies solely on training with normal executions,
while competing approaches require long training sessions
with injected faults [38]. Sessions with injected faults strongly
limit the applicability of the approaches to large and evolving
cloud systems that badly tolerate if at all artificially faulty
sessions, and that cannot be replicated in the laboratory.
D. Threats to Validity
The main threats to the validity of our results derive from
the fault injection strategy, the configuration of the prototype
and the type of faults that we considered in the experiments.
We mitigated the bias that may derive from the specific fault
injection strategy that we adopted by both using ChaosMon-
key, a freely available tool for fault injection, and considering
multiple activation patterns to increase the generality.
The specific configuration of our prototype and of the set
of faults that we investigated may limit the generality of our
results. Building complex infrastructures and repeating the
experiments with multiple testbeds is extremely expensive.
We mitigate this bias by experimenting with ClearWater, an
environment widely used in academia and industry since it is
designed for scalable deployment in the cloud [38, 4].
The scalability of LOUD has not been tested, but it is
potentially allowed by the nature of the algorithm, which is
based on IBM ITOA-PI, a tool for big data analytics, and
Pagerank which is by definition a scalable algorithm.
We experimented with a relatively small set of types of
faults. Although LOUD does not depend on the specific class
of faults, its effectiveness may depend on the faults as observed
in the paper. For this reason, we report and discuss the results
at the level of individual fault types.
VII. RELATED WORK
So far, cloud-based fault localization [42, 25] focused on
few fault types, the most common ones being performance
faults, resource faults, and operational faults. Performance
faults are faults that cause the unexpected degradation of the
system performance, such as packet loss faults. Performance
faults may be due to chronic problems [19, 21], task in-
terference [30, 8], and latency increment [28, 15, 16, 37].
Resource faults [20, 7, 38, 33, 43] are faults that cause the
incorrect allocation and use of system resources, such as
memory leakages and CPU hogs. Resource faults may also
derive from the excessive use and exhaustion of resources.
Operational faults [9, 49, 26, 41, 29] are execution faults
that impact on performance, and originate from deadlocks,
infinite loops, unhandled exceptions and emergent behaviors.
Our experimental evaluation with LOUD considered both
performance and operational faults.
Fault localization techniques implement different analysis
techniques: latency analysis, data analytics, machine learning,
graph-based approaches and their combination.
Latency Analysis consists of identifying operations with
anomalous latency to diagnose the possible faulty elements re-
sponsible of the anomalies. The localization can be at different
granularity levels, from individual methods to network nodes.
For example, CloudDiag [28] captures user requests, traces
the execution time of the individual methods, and identifies
the method calls that are likely responsible of an observed
anomaly, based on the distribution of the latency time. Some-
time the cause of a problem is not a single method but a
sequence of method calls. This is why DARC [45] identifies
the root cause path, which is a call-path that starts from a given
function and includes the largest latency contributors to a given
peak time. call-graph. Khanna et al. at define an architecture
for the localization of faulty nodes and links by collecting
network measurements [22]. LOUD is not limited to latency
analysis but collects and analyzes a range of data, including
the data necessary for performance analysis, as reported in the
empirical evaluation.
Data Analytics exploits various kinds of statistical tech-
niques to localize faults. PeerWatch [20] uses canonical corre-
lation analysis (CCA) to identify the correlations between the
characteristics of multiple application instances and localize
faults. PerfCompass [8] collects data about the performance
of system calls while virtual machines behave correctly, and
analyzes the data collected in the presence of performance
problems to classify the root cause of the fault as either
external or internal. Johnsson et al. define an algorithm to
determine the root cause of a performance degradation prob-
lem by using network level measurements and a graphical
model of the network [19]. Herodotou et al. focus on data
center failures [16], using active monitoring techniques, such
as pings, to produce a ranked list of devices and links that are
likely related to the root cause. While statistical techniques
may capture the resources with a behavior correlated well with
the observed failures, they cannot always trace a problem to
its root cause, because they do not consider how misbehaviors
propagate across the resources of the system, as centrality
indices do in LOUD.
Machine Learning is another widely adopted solution to lo-
calize faults. UBL [7] leverages Self-Organizing Maps (SOM),
a particular type of Artificial Neural Network, to capture
emergent behaviors and unknown anomalies. Yuan et al.
exploit machine learning to analyze system call information
on Windows XP, and classify the information according to
known faults [51]. POD-Diagnosis [49] deals with faults in
sporadic operations, for instance, upgrade, and replacement, by
extracting events from logs, detecting errors from events, and
using a pre-constructed tree that encodes fault knowledge to
identify the root causes. BCT [26] exploits behavioral models
inferred from tests execution to identify the causes of software
failures. Sauvanaud et al. [38] use Random Forest to detect
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) violations and infer the
root cause. While many techniques based on machine learning
build their models involving prior characterization of the fault,
through either fault injection or human knowledge, LOUD
localizes faults by exploiting centrality indices and studying
the propagation of the anomalies in the cloud. In this way,
LOUD requires only data from normal executions and needs
no predefined fault profile.
Graph-based approaches localize faults by using graph
models derived from the network topology and dependencies
between services. Sharma et al. propose an algorithm to
localize the problematic metrics by using a dependency graph
built with invariants among system metrics [40]. Gestalt [29]
combines the features of existing algorithms to find the cul-
prit component in a transaction failure, with the help of a
dependency graph. Srikar et al. propose an adaptive algorithm
to diagnose large-scale failures in computer networks [44],
by analyzing a graph that represents the network topology.
Graph-based approaches that refer to structural dependencies
might miss the often relevant indirect impact that the behavior
of a resource may have on another resource. LOUD analyzes
a graph that represents causal relations between anomalous
KPIs, thus referring to the monitored mutual impact among
the resources in the system.
Some approaches combine different techniques similarly
to LOUD, but focus on a single fault type. PerfScope [9]
combines hierarchical clustering, outlier detection and finite
state machine based matching, to address operational faults.
Kahuna [43] combines clustering and latency analysis on
Hadoop network resource faults. CloudPD [41] combines
Hidden Markov Models (HMM), k-nearest-neighbor (kNN),
and k-means clustering to build the performance model,
and uses statistical correlations to identify anomalies and
signature-based classification to identify operational faults.
Pingmesh [15] combines data analytics and latency analysis
to detect network faults.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we present LOUD, an approach for localizing
faults in cloud systems, which is based on graph centrality
algorithms to efficiently locate faults with limited interference
with the target system both during training and operational
conditions. The LOUD approach improves over state-of-the-
art techniques, by (i) relying on a training phase that requires
only normal executions, thus supporting model training in the
field without the relevant interferences that derive from the
fault injection required by current techniques, (ii) running on
an independent machine that works on metrics usually already
collected in the field, and thus with negligible interference with
the system, and (iii) locating faults with an efficiency in line
with the best state-of-the-art approaches.
The unique LOUD feature of relying only on data from
normal executions, jointly with the negligible execution over-
head, and the good effectiveness make LOUD well suited for
the many large over-running systems that cannot be suspended
and sand-boxed to perform in-lab experiments.
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